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This general session on intennodal transportation is indeed timely. Some have already declared the 1990s to be the "Intermodal Decade." Although that prediction might be premature, there are 
developments in the intermodal area suggesting a significant increase in 
the importance of intermodal transportation in this decade. For example, 
on the public sector side, the legislation that was passed in late 1991 
providing reauthorization for the highway and mass transportation 
programs was named the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 
Act (ISTEA). This act establishes a policy of encouraging the development 
of a national intermodal transportation system and a new intermodal 
office in the U.S. Department of Transportation. In the private sector, the 
three industry organizations merged into the new and larger Intermodal 
Association of North America. Most importantly, we are seeing the forma-
tion of strategic alliances between motor carriers and railroads to 
facilitate intermodal rail-truck movements. 
I have been asked to discuss the intermodal freight problems and 
-opportunities. Of course, intermodal freight movements can pertain to a 
number of combination of modes: rail-truck, rail-barge, truck-barge, 
rail-ocean vessels, truck-air, and even air-ocean going vessels. All of these 
September 28-30, 1992 75 
combinations on this non-exhaustive list of possible interrnodal arrange-
ments are being used. Although I have a strong interest in and have 
conducted research in rail-barge transportation of grain and coal (a com-
modity very important to the Commonwealth of Kentucky), I will focus 
today's comments on developments and the future ofintermodal freight 
transportation involving railroads and trucking. 
To provide some perspective on the current rail-truck intermodal 
issues, I will first outline the history of rail-truck intermodal transporta-
tion. Next, the basic problems facing this type ofinterrnodal transporta-
tion and a recently implemented approach to solving these problems will 
be discussed. Finally, I will identify opportunities for rail-truck inter-
modal transportation in the future. 
Brief History of Rail-Truck lntermodal Transportation 
Railroads quickly became aware of the advantages of moving freight 
in a truck trailer to reduce the handling at the railroad terminal. The 
first recorded carriage of freight by intermodal truck trailers on railroad 
flatcars occurred in 1926 on the Chicago North Shore and Milwaukee 
Railroad. Either because the railroads were unwilling to accept the new 
concepts or unable to because of the actions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), container service never developed into significant 
business until the 1950s. The ICC viewed the development of container-
ization as encouraging too much cooperation between the two modes and 
issued a ruling which made it uneconomical for all parties to use inter-
modal transportation . The Association of American Railroads further 
thwarted interrnodal cooperation by establishing a resolution against 
through routes and joint rail-truck rates except where such arrange-
ments would not constitute invasion of another railroad's territory. 
The year of 1954 was a pivotal year in the development of rail-truck 
intermodal transportation because of an ICC ruling in the New Haven 
Case that said hauling trailers on flatcars was transportation by rail and, 
therefore, did not require a motor-carrier certificate. In essence, it re-
versed the 1931 case and thus paved the way for use of both trailers 
(TOFC) and containers (COFC). It should be noted that containers are 
simply boxes that require chassis for use on the highway. The year 1956 
also was very significant given that Malcom McLean introduced the first 
"containership." Although his first containership actually hauled trailers, 
he soon had a true containership and other shipping lines adopted the 
new approach for carrying international freight. Because of a variety of 
economic, public policy, and management reasons, many were slow to 
join the container revolution. Until 1966, containership operation was 
primarily a domestic phenomenon with few foreign shipping lines 
involved. We will see later that these containers now play a major role in 
rail-truck intermodal transportation. 
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During the 1960s, rail intennodal traffic remained predominantly 
TOFC. In the 1970s, new container-oriented services such as Landbridge, 
Minibridge, and Microbridge became available reflecting the greater use 
of containerships in international ocean movements. In addition, the 
Pacific Rim countries were emerging as the major trading partners with 
the United States with increasing amounts of their imports heading for 
population centers in the Midwest, East, and Europe. This change in-
creased the amount oflandbridge activities and containers moving by rail. 
During the 1980s, the amount ofrail-truck intennodal movements 
increased significantly and the nature ofintermodal movements changed. 
Several factors largely explain these changes. First, in 1981, the ICC 
removed rail COFC and TOFC movements from economic regulation. 
Deregulation granted the railroads pricing and operating freedoms to 
promote intermodalism. In addition, the regulatory environment pro-
duced by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
facilitated rail-truck mergers that were not permitted by the ICC before 
that time. Under this new regulatory environment, the Norfolk Southern 
acquired the North American Van Lines, the Union Pacific purchased 
Overnite, and the Burlington Northern acquired a number of smaller car-
riers which it later sold. Although the impact of these intermodal mergers 
on intennodal activities is not clear, in theory they reduced some of the 
transaction costs inherent in movements involving more than one mode. 
Possibly a more significant development occurred in 1984 when 
American President Lines (APL) began extensive double-stack operations. 
By 1988, 76 trains operated each week between 20 city-pairs. Double 
stacking containers reduced capital, fuel, and labor costs per container. 
Cost savings for the line-haul. portion of the train movement have been 
estimated as high as 40 percent by the Association of American Railroads. 
In addition, cost savings and marketing advantages for double stack lies 
with low loss and damage because of the platform articulation and less 
switching of double-stack trains. The most recent double-stack develop-
ments include the expansion of this service for domestic movements and 
for service into Mexico. Having to cross the Chicago and North Western 
mainline between Omaha and Chicago each day to get to my office on the 
Iowa State University campus, I can personally attest to the proliferation 
of these double-stack trains. The use of these more efficient and customer 
service oriented, double-stack trains was fueled by the increased United 
States imports and exports during the 1980s. Other important develop-
ments during the 1980s include the consolidation of rail intermodal ter-
minals. Iri 1974, there were 1,500 terminals with 105 of those being 
mechanized. In 1989, the number had been reduced to 300 with 215 of 
those being mechanized. In Iowa, for example, in 1980, there were 37 
terminals in 22 cities while in 1988, there were only 15 terminals in 
12 cities. The rail systems adopted a hub-spoke network system for 
providing rail intermodal services. 
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In addition, there were significant technological advances for the 
rolling stock involved in double-stack cars and in communications 
technology. Furthermore, in the most recent time period, we are seeing 
the development of much larger containers. These "second generation" 
trailers have increased in size to include 53-foot, 110-inch door containers. 
Much of the technological advances in the communications area focused 
on electronic data interchange systems which facilitate the tracing of 
shipments and coordination of the different activities involved in an 
intermodal movement. 
The economic, commercial, technological, and public policy forces 
above had a dramatic impact on the level and nature of rail-truck inter-
modal transportation since 1955. In 1955, when railroads began collecting 
data on intermodal loadings, less than one-half of one percent of total rail 
loadings was intermodal. Now, that percentage is more than 20 percent of 
total rail loadings, making intermodal second only to coal in terms of car-
loadings. In 1990, rail intermodal revenues were about $6 billion or 20 per-
cent of total railroad revenues. Intermodal volume in 1991 totaled more 
than 6.2 million trailers and containers. It is important to note that 
trailers only outnumbered containers 3.2 million to 3.0 million. Data 
indicate that containers outpaced trailers for the first six months of 1992. 
Current Problems and Opportunities 
The briefreview of the history ofrail intermodal indicates an 
impressive growth. But, how strong is rail intermodal transportation 
today and what are its prospects for future growth and economic viability? 
I will first address the strength of rail intermodal by looking at several 
of the key problems and one approach to solving those problems. My 
definition of current starts with 1990 and goes several years into the 
future . Later, I will conjecture on what the longer term future holds for 
rail intermodal. 
First, the potential market for rail intermodal traffic is huge. Despite 
the impressive growth, intermodal freight accounts for just 3 to 4 percent 
of total intercity freight movements. In a recent survey by the Intermodal 
Association of America, shippers indicated that they plan to move 20 per-
cent of their freight by intermodal in 1993. In terms of the relevant 
market, which would include moves of 700 miles or more, intermodal is 
doing much better. One estimate shows that intermodal's share is more 
than 50 percent for movements of 1,500 miles, and at least 30 percent for 
movements of 700 miles or more. The real market potential is in the $30-
to-$40 billion range with intermodal now capturing $6 billion of that 
market. 
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Problems in providing intermodal transportation 
What are the factors that might be impeding additional shippers from 
using rail intermodal or the carriers and third parties from providing 
more intermodal services? Some of these factors are really symptoms of 
more fundamental problems associated with multi-modal movements. 
Several of the most important are: 
• Perceptions of intermodal service performance: Intermodal 
providers and their customers generally agree that transit times 
and reliability have improved. In a recent survey, 67 percent of the 
shippers using intermodal transportation indicated that intermodal 
service had improved over the last three years, compared to 62 per-
cent who said the same of truck service. Among intermodal non-
users, however, only 28 percent said intermodal improved; 68 
percent said truck improved. 
Despite this perception gap, 6 percent more shippers used inter-
modal last year and 34 percent of the shippers shifted freight from 
truck to intermodal. Why? The pressure to cut costs during a reces-
sion works in intermodal's favor-the importance of price or costs as 
a modal selection criterion increased from eighth to third last year. 
This recession has been painful but has provided an opportunity for 
rail intermodal transportation to gain and keep shippers. Unlike the 
early 1980s when the recession shifted shippers to intermodal 
transportation, the participants in intermodal transportation have 
? the ability to provide the service promised. Early in the decade, 
intermodal service expectations of shippers, which was based upon 
promises of the intermodal providers, exceeded intermodal service 
capabilities. 
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• Lack of a seamless transportation service. Shippers now using 
truckload transportation demand seamless transportation- a single 
source responsible for the entire move. Shippers want and therefore 
need in this customer-oriented era one-stop seamless shopping. 
They want convenience in consummating transactions for inter-
modal service. Shippers want to minimize transaction costs which 
include search, negotiation, and enforcement costs. They also want 
to be able to quickly trace shipments and easily process and resolve 
loss and damage claims. Shippers have developed different 
strategies for coping with these transaction costs in dealing with 
intermodal. They utilize third parties to a large extent. These third 
' parties range greatly in size and sophistication. The largest, the 
Hub Group, provides a full range of services including Electronic 
Data Interchange (EDI) services which provide tracing capabilities. 
EDI is the computer-to-computer exchange of business applications 
between firms using strictly standardized formats . The one problem 
with many of these third parties is that they contract out the 
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drayage service, or the local trucking service needed to consummate 
an intermodal move. To many, the weak link in the intermodal 
service is the drayage component. In addition, the drayage service is 
a costly component of the move with distances between intermodal 
loading and unloading sites getting longer each year as the number 
ofloading and unloading sites becomes smaller. 
• Low Profitability. Despite impressive growth during the last 10 
years, intermodal revenue growth has not produced much net in-
come. Without a higher level of profitability, railroads and others 
will not have the incentive to invest in needed equipment and tech-
nology. Ironically, intermodal traffic is the only growth sector for 
many railroads, which will have the effect of driving down the 
overall profitability of the rail system. Conrail analyzed the low 
profitability issue and concluded the poor utilization of trailers and 
containers was the main reason for the problem. Conrail noted that 
J. B. Hunt achieved six days per cycle for its trailers while Conrail 
only achieved 18 days per cycle for its trailers involved in single-line 
intermodal. This number could increase to 36 days on interline 
moves. 
Strategic Alliances and Partnershipping to Improve 
lntermodal Transportation 
Recent developments in rail-truck partnerships appear to have the 
potential of solving many of the problems associated with intermodal 
transportation including the three above. Although United Parcel Service 
has had contracts with railroads for years to move UPS freight intermodal-
ly, J. B. Hunt and the Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. are con-
sidered the pioneers in this trend. In late 1990, these two carriers created 
their Quantum intermodal service. After a slow start, this partnership is 
now moving 2,000 Hunt trailers a week on Santa Fe track between the 
Midwest and West Coast. Subsequently, J.B. Hunt has entered into 
partnership arrangements with the Burlington Northern, Southern 
Pacific, Florida East Coast, Union Pacific, Conrail, and the Wisconsin 
Central. 
Other truckload carriers are forming similar strategic alliances. 
Schneider National worked with the Southern Pacific on some long hauls 
in 1991 and plans to launch double-stack service in conjunction with the 
Burlington Northern Railroad. North American Van Lines entered into an 
agreement with the Union Pacific Railroad for intermodal movements. 
Strategic alliances between railroads and large truckload carriers 
address to some degree each of the problems listed above. First, given that 
the truckload industry, particularly the Advanced Truckload Carriers like 
J . B. Hunt and Schneider, set the standards for customer service, inter-
modal service provided by these strategic alliances has credibility with 
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shippers. Shippers' perception of the quality of intermodal service 
provided by these alliances is higher than it is under other arrangements. 
Second, although each strategic alliance is different, the alliances tend to 
reduce the number of participants involved in the delivery of the inter-
modal service. Quantum, for example, is set up for one-stop, seamless 
shopping for intermodal shippers. In other arrangements, the number of 
participants are likely to be reduced with possibly drayage and sales and 
marketing being provided by the participating motor carrier. Third, these 
alliances have the potential to increase the profitability of intermodal 
services. Unlike third parties, motor carriers bring rolling stock assets 
to the table and a reputation of intensely managing those assets. These 
motor carriers also can strengthen the weakest link in the intermodal 
movement--drayage. 
Several questions surround these new alliances. How long will they 
last? Will these arrangements expand intermodal business by taking 
freight off the highways or simply take intermodal business from third 
parties? Will strategic alliances be the wave of the future? These ques-
tions are difficult ones to answer. 
These alliances will last as long as the underlying economics support 
them. In general, we are seeing more alliances or partnerships throughout 
the logistics area. For these particular types of rail-truck alliances, it is 
too early to tell. It is interesting to note that some of these partners were 
very recently bitter enemies with respect to the LCV (longer combination 
vehicles) issue. Ifl may paraphrase John Anderson, Executive Vice 
President of Marketing and Sales for the Burlington Northern Railroad, 
these partnerships between rail and motor carriers can work. The decision 
on when to be friends with your foe is determined by the needs of the 
customer. 
It is too early to tell if these strategic alliances will expand intermodal 
transportation and will be the wave of the future . Clearly, some shipper 
agents are concerned about loss of their traffic. Furthermore, not all rail-
roads are sold on the Quantum type of arrangements. Some of these car-
riers argue that the use of tripartite agreements among a shipper, third 
party, and railroad will achieve the same cost and marketing objectives. 
What does the future hold for intermodal? 
How much freight will move intermodally in the future? How will the 
intermodal services be delivered? Will intermodal transportation be able 
to exploit shorter-haul markets? Will the United States finally have a 
national intermodal system? Intermodal transportation's ability to in-
crease its current market share of 3 to 4 percent to a more significant 
market share will be determined by a number of factors . It will depend 
upon public policy, fuel prices, driver shortages, international trade 
developments, technological advances, and other developments which 
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are impossible to predict. As demonstrated by the quick acc
eptance of 
double-stack service, the manner in which rail intermodal s
ervices are 
provided is likely to change as innovative marketing packag
es are 
developed and new or improved technologies are developed 
and adopted. 
Before looking at some of these factors affecting intermodal
 growth, I will 
conjecture about the new traffic opportunities for intermoda
lism in the 
near future. 
New traffic opportunities in the future 
Most of the surveys indicate that future growth ofrail inter
modalism 
will come from shippers now using intermodal. These shipp
ers know that 
intermodal transportation is able to meet the more stringen
t customer 
demands of today while the nonusers are more difficult to co
nvince. 
In addition, there is increasing evidence that intermodal tra
nsporta-
tion is gaining acceptance in the refrigerator products traffi
c market. 
KLLM, Inc., a major refrigerated truck operator has entered
 into an agree-
ment with the Santa Fe Railway. The initial runs between F
ort Worth 
and Los Angeles were successful and additional runs betwe
en Los An-
geles and Chicago and Kansas City were added. It should be n
oted that 
this service uses KLLM trailers with improved, more reliab
le refrigera-
tion units. 
Another area oflikely growth is the domestic use of tank co
ntainers. 
The Union Pacific already has a number of service points fo
r its bulk tank 
container service called "Bulk Tainer." These tank containe
rs hold about 
6,000 gallons and are used for either food products or chemi
cals. 
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Factors affecting the extent and nature of future use: 
• 
• 
• 
Public policy with respect to Longer Combination Vehic
les 
(LCVs): The recently enacted lntermodal Surface Transportati
on 
Efficiency Act limits the operation of LCV s to the states in w
hich 
they were operating on June 1, 1991. Should LCVs be perm
itted 
and used, the productivity of the trucking industry would be
 en-
hanced and would likely capture some of the intermodal fre
ight. 
Fuel prices: Several scenarios are possible with fuel prices in-
creasing either because of higher fuel taxes, either to suppo
rt 
highways or to reduce the deficit, or because of higher produ
ction 
and distribution costs of the diesel fuel. It is likely that incr
eases 
in fuel prices as the result of tax hikes will be accompanied 
by 
more regulatory freedoms to use LCVs. 
Severity and length of driver shortage: As will be noted lat
er, 
truckload trucking firms are becoming increasingly involved
 in 
intermodal arrangements with railroads. One driving force 
of 
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these arrangements is the difficulty of truckload motor carriers in 
attracting and maintaining drivers particularly for the longer 
hauls. It is logical for these firms to enter into intermodal arrange-
ments to help address their most pressing driver shortage area. 
The driver shortage for the truckload carrier is real and likely to 
be long term. It will be exacerbated with an improving economy 
as some drivers will find better opportunities outside the trucking 
industry. If the trucking industry increases pay scales to attract 
drivers, it becomes less competitive with rail intermodal. 
• Development and adoption of new technology: Some 
intermodal followers predict major technological advances in 
intermodal transportation during this next decade. These 
advances are predicted to be in new information technology used 
to make the multimodal party intermodal appear to be seamless. 
The major advances are not predicted to be in type ofrolling 
stock. The advances in information technology include a wider 
acceptance of currently available EDI technology by all the par-
ties involved in intermodal moves including drayage companies 
and small third parties. This will allow real-time communications 
among the various parties which will enhance the coordination of 
intermodal partners. This use of EDI allows intermodal shippers 
to trace their shipments. Some predict that new information tech-
nology will allow shippers to go beyond knowing where their 
containers are to what is in the containers. Another technological 
advancement that will be adopted within the next two years will 
be the Automatic Equipment Identification system which allows 
the tracking of cars, not simply trains. 
New technologies may allow intermodal transportation to 
become competitive in the shorter haul markets-those markets 
less than 700 miles and with less volumes than traditional inter-
modal markets. A joint effort between the CSX and the New York 
Airbtake Company, called the Iron Highway, is producing a tech-
nology that in theory will lower the break-even point for inter-
modal to drop to about 350 miles and about 20 trailers. The 
"carless" technology, such as the RoadRailer, has met with mixed 
success but work continues on making it possible to integrate 
RoadRailers with other types of railcars. 
• Political climate and clout: Some have argued that the destiny 
ofintermodal transportation may be a function of the extent to 
which intermodalists get involved in the political process and, in 
particular, assist in shaping national transportation policy. As 
noted above, there have been recent developments indicating that 
the political climate and the political clout for intermodalism are 
improving. The merging of three industry organizations into the 
new and larger lntermodal Association of North America should 
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enhance the political clout ofintennodal transportation. The 
passing of the lntermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
clearly reflected an improved political climate for intermodal 
transportation. The law reflects a congressional commitment to 
intennodal transportation and establishes an office ofinter-
modalism in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Transportation 
and a National Commission on lntennodal Transportation to 
study a number of issues that have impeded the development of 
intermodal transportation. • 
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